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Abstract. We consider the little-known anthropic argument of Fontenelle dealing with the 
nature of cometary orbits, given a year before the publication of Newton's Principia. This is 
particularly interesting in view of the rapid development of the recently resurgent theories of 
cometary catastrophism and their role in the modern astrobiological debates, for instance in the 
“rare Earth” hypothesis of Ward and Brownlee.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The issue of stability of conditions prevailing on (at least potentially) habitable planets 
throughout the Galaxy is the central question of the nascent science of astrobiology (e.g. 
Darling 2001). We are lucky enough to live in an epoch of great astronomical 
discoveries, the most distinguished probably being the discovery of dozens of planets 
orbiting nearby stars (for nice reviews, see Marcy and Butler 1998, 2000; Ksanfomaliti 
2000). This particular discovery brings about a profound change in our thinking about 
the universe, and prompts further questions on the frequency of Earth-like habitats 
elsewhere in the Galaxy. In a sense, it answers a question posed since antiquity: are 
there other, potentially inhabited or inhabitable, worlds in the vastness of space?  In 
asking that question, obviously, we take into account our properties as intelligent 
observers, as well as physical, chemical and other pre-conditions necessary for our 
existence. The latter are the topic of the so-called anthropic principle(s), the subject of 
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much debate and controversy in cosmology, fundamental physics, and philosophy of 
science. 
Arguably the most significant construal of the anthropic principle(s) is the one 
having to do with restrictions that the existence of human beings places on the 
observable features of the universe (Carter 1974, 1983; Barrow and Tipler 1986; 
Bostrom 2002). In other words, the anthropic principle acts as an observation selection 
effect in the set of all possible observations of the universe. However, the very definition 
of the universe evolved, of course (cf. Munitz 1986). The universe of the standard (“Big 
Bang”) cosmological model is drastically different from the essentially static and eternal 
(or supernaturally created in essentially the same state) universe of previous epochs, 
notably the one of Bruno, Descartes, Halley, Newton, Laplace, Lord Kelvin, and early 
Einstein. In attempting to reconstruct the evolution of cosmological and cosmogonical 
thinking, one should be very careful to avoid conflating various levels of cosmological 
discourse with which we are familiar today, with those known in earlier times. On the 
contrary, a conclusion of some generality arrived at in the times of much poorer level of 
understanding and description is certainly to be exceptionally praised from both the 
historical and the epistemological points of view.  
In this note, it is our goal to show that one of the very first instances of anthropic 
thinking, applied to planetary science and astrobiology (in modern terms), occurred very 
early, in the work of French philosopher and naturalist Bernard Le Bouyier de 
Fontenelle (1657-1757), published in 1686, a single year before the great scientific 
revolution inaugurated by Newton's Principia. Fontenelle (Figure 1) was one of the 
most important precursors of the Enlightenment. In his long and productive career, he  
touched upon practically all aspects of human knowledge, other books of his bearing 
titles such as On the Usefulness of Mathematical Learning or A History of Oracles. Of 
course, the recent Copernican revolution in astronomy and cosmology could not escape 
his attention, and he supported the new paradigm with more than his usual eloquence 
and wit in Conversation on the Plurality of the Worlds, where the argument presently 
under scrutiny is located. 
Fontenelle's argument deals with the comets, bodies which presented an 
incredibly popular scientific topic in his day, and which have remained in the focus of 
interest of planetary studies until now. It was already known, through the great studies 
of Halley and others (see Yeomans 1991; Schechen 1997) that comets travel around the 
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Sun on very elongated orbits which have high inclinations, that is, their orbital planes 
are at large angles from the orbital planet of Earth (and other planets known at the time). 
The late XVII century was in many ways obsessed with these strange celestial visitors 
and with good reason (see, for instance, a colorful “catalogue” of bright comets in 
Figure 2). For important epistemological and cultural implications of comet 
observations in the relevant period, see an excellent study by Barker and Goldstein 
(1988). The unusual orbital behavior of comets, in eyes of Fontenelle and his 
contemporaries (as well as of modern cosmogonists!) is strange and requires an 
explanation. He offered an unusual, ingenious, and even today controversial argument.  
 
 
2. Fontenelle’s argument 
 
The remarkable argument put forward by Fontenelle in 1686, a single year before the 
appearance of Newton’s majestic Principia and ten years before Whiston's A New 
Theory of Earth,1 is essentially contained in a single paragraph of his Conversation on 
the Plurality of the Worlds. It reads (Fontenelle 1767):  
 
In the next places, the reason why the planes of their [comets'] 
motions are not in the plane of the ecliptic, or any of the planetary 
orbits, is extremely evident; for had this been the case, it would have 
been impossible for the Earth to be out of the way of the comets’ tails. 
Nay, the possibility of an immediate encounter or shock of the body, 
of a comet would have been too frequent; and considering how great 
is the velocity of a comet at such a time, the collision of two such 
bodies must necessarily be destructive of each other; nor perhaps 
could the inhabitants of planets long survive frequent immersions in 
the tails of comets, as they would be liable to in such a situation. Not 
to mention anything of the irregularities and confusion that must 
happen in the motion of planets and comets, if their orbits were all 
disposed in the same plane. 
                                                 
1 The book which is usually celebrated as the first serious attempt at formulating a theory of cometary 
catastrophism. 
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Thus, to the question: why are (observed) orbits of comets highly inclined, in 
contradistinction to the coplanar planetary orbits? Fontenelle offers a deceptively 
simple answer. We would not be here – to contemplate on the peculiarities of cometary 
trajectories – if these orbits were different (that is, similar to those of planets). This had 
been published 8 years before celebrated Halley's suggestion of December 12, 1694, 
that comets might collide with planets (Halley 1726): 
 
This is spoken to Astronomers: But, what might be the Consequences 
of so near an Appulse; or of a Contact; or, lastly, of a Shock of the 
Coelestial Bodies, (which is by no means impossible to come to pass) 
I leave to be discuss'd by the Studious of Physical Matters.  
 
This famous idea has been followed up by such luminaries as Newton, Wright, Laplace, 
Lagrange, and others, in the vein of what is usually (and only partially justifiable) called 
“Biblical catastrophism” of the pre-Cuvier epoch.2 Fontenelle wrote the passage more 
than 18 years before Newton wondered (in Opticks): 
 
Whence is it that planets move all one and the same way in orbs 
concentrick, while comets move all manner of ways in orbs very 
excentric... blind Fate could never make all the planets move one and 
the same way in orbs concentrick, some inconsiderable irregularities 
excepted, which may have risen from the mutual actions of comets 
and planets upon one another, and which will be apt to increase, till 
this system wants a reformation. Such a wonderful uniformity in the 
planetary system must be allowed the effect of choice. 
 
Thus Newton, as a great promoter of the Design argument in natural philosophy, failed 
to understand the power of the Fontenelle's argument, and went deeper into a blind alley 
(from the modern point of view) of seeking the supranatural Design and/or regulating 
mechanism. The same tension between the apparent design and the explanatory 
                                                 
2 For colourful pieces of its history, see Clube and Napier 1990. 
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“filtering” through various observation selection effects persists to this day, and is the 
source of innumerable debates and confusions. We shall return to this point below.  
Unfortunately, in the subsequent long dogmatic slumber of uniformitarian 
domination in the entire realm of natural sciences, it has been too often forgotten what is 
and what is not “by no means impossible to come to pass”. In the present era of revived 
“neocatastrophism” (e.g. Schindewolf 1962; Clube and Napier 1982, 1984, 1990; Clube 
1995; Raup 1999), some of these early thinkers (like Halley) received a renewed 
attention, but Fontenelle is undeservedly rarely mentioned. It is one of the purposes of 
this note that this historical injustice is at least partially rectified. 
Now, there are two arguments in the quoted passage of Fontenelle. The first 
concerns the dynamical influence through impacts. Impacts of comets upon planets 
would have been much more frequent and destructive if their orbits lay in the plain of 
the ecliptic. Such collisions would be highly destructive to lifeforms (especially 
advanced and intelligent ones). As we shall see below, its validity has been fortified by 
scientific findings in recent decades. The second argument concerns the effects of 
immersion of inhabited planets in cometary tails. The standard modern view is that this 
does not make sense, since such phenomena are thought to be completely harmless, due 
to the excessively low density of cometary tails. Still, there are some dissenters from 
this view, the most famous being the late Sir Fred Hoyle, who (with Chandra 
Wickramasinghe) argued, rather notoriously, that comets may be vehicles for 
panspermia, and even cause familiar cases of epidemic diseases (Hoyle and 
Wickramasinghe 1979; Hoyle, Wickramasinghe, and Watkins 1986). Another suggested 
effect is a possible climatic influence due to depositing of cometary dust, with the 
zodiacal cloud as an intermediate reservoir, in the Earth's atmosphere (Hoyle 1987; 
Napier 2001). It would be only prudent to state that the effects of prolonged interaction 
of a cometary tail and the Earth have not been meticulously studied so far. In any case, 
there is obviously less interaction between Earth and comets due to this specific feature 
(high inclination) of the latters' orbits in comparison to the counterfactual case 
Fontenelle considers.  
 Now, what could be counted as an explanation of this particular feature? When 
we come to the “grand questions” оn the origin of the universe (or “world,” construed in 
some narrower sense!), we are left with surprisingly few viable options. One of them, 
certainly unsatisfactory, is to claim some supernatural or Divine cause which is not 
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accessible to further elucidation. Another, and it has become more and more interesting 
as modern cosmology progressed, is that any atypical particular feature can be made 
unsurprising and “natural” by embedding it in a set or distribution broad enough to 
include many (or all) cases of the phenomenon in question. This is the usual approach of 
the anthropic thinking. Thus, Fontenelle may appeal to a kind of “principle of 
fecundity” (Nozick 1981): we explain the observed feature of a system by embedding 
its specific features into a wider system where many (or all) possibilities are realized. 
As Nozick (1981, p. 131) writes: 
 
The principle of fecundity is an invariance principle. Within general 
relativity, scientific laws are invariant with respect to all differentiable 
coordinate transformations. The principle of fecundity's description of 
the structure of possibilities is invariant across all possible worlds. 
There is no one specially privileged or preferred possibility, including 
the one we call actual... The actual world has no specially privileged 
status, it merely is the world where we are. Other independently 
realized possibilities also are correctly referred to by their inhabitants 
as actual. 
 
Of course, Nozick speaks of it in the language of modern metaphysics, but we need to 
remember that the ontological construal of the locution “world” has undergone 
revolutionary changes since the epoch of Enlightenment. The universe of Fontenelle 
was essentially the universe of Bruno: an ensemble of different planetary systems taken 
as the self-contained ontological units. That Fontenelle's worlds were planets (solar and 
extrasolar) and that his main interest was astrobiological is testified by the following 
words from his Preface: 
 
I have chosen that part of Philosophy which is most like to excite 
curiosity; for what can more concern us, than to know how this world 
which we inhabit, is made; and whether there be any other worlds like 
it, which are also inhabited as this is? 
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(Parenthetically, these words have been used as motto by one of the earliest 
astrobiological treatises in XX century, “Life on Other Worlds”, by Sir Harold Spencer 
Jones, the Astronomer Royal; see Spencer Jones 1952). As we today—inspired by 
inflation and other developments in quantum cosmology—speak of topologically 
disconnected cosmological domains (“universes”) within a larger whole (the 
“multiverse”; cf. Linde 1990), thus Fontenelle spoke on the differently arranged 
planetary domains.  
And the multitude of worlds (however rationally construed) gives an excellent 
physical basis for application of the anthropic selection effect. Among many worlds, the 
distinction between inhabited and uninhabited is readily made. And the issue of 
perception of peculiarity of inhabited subset in the entire set is a legitimate target of 
physical inquiry. In other words, we have three possible options of explaining the 
peculiar (non-planar) nature of cometary orbits in our planetary system. The first is to 
deny the validity and meaningfulness of the question; this is the standard theistic answer 
which forbids further discussion. Beside the unacceptable epistemological nature of this 
answer, one should mention that it is today completely irrational to apply it to such  
small subsystems as the Solar system, since we know that they form as part of a much 
larger whole. As to the origin and properties of this larger whole (the Galaxy) we do 
have different (and working!) explanations. From the other two options, one—causal—
entails the idea that there is a law-like reason (presumably to be derived from the future 
“Theory of Everything” or some other high-level physical theory) for atypical or 
surprising structure of the early Solar system. In other words, an enormous amount of 
information necessary for description of the atypical initial conditions can be encoded in 
some new law(s) of nature and consequent law-like correlations of various matter and 
vacuum fields. This option is still viable for cosmology, but hardly for planetary 
cosmogony. Cosmogonical initial conditions are not privileged in any way over initial 
conditions for any other physical process; we do not seek an explanation for (say) the 
formation of chemical elements in a future unified field theory. We seek it much lower 
down on the epistemological ladder. The other—anthropic—option is to avoid giving a 
specific description through embedding those conditions into a sufficiently symmetric 
(“typical”) background. Again, stated in terms of information, the same long description 
of what we perceive as atypical initial conditions arises—as so often in physics!—from 
the process of symmetry breaking. The overall description is simple enough, and may be 
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reduced (in the extreme case) to a rule similar to “All possible combinations of initial 
conditions exist.” That such a high degree of symmetry can indeed completely 
reproduce the situation in our particular cosmological domain becomes an immediate 
consequence (cf. Tegmark 1996; Collier 1996).  
Let us now think of the application of this mode of thinking to the particular 
cosmogonical issue. We would similarly say “planetary systems with all possible 
configurations of planetary and cometary orbits exist” as a part of the larger whole (say 
our Galaxy). Now, we ask: are all such configurations compatible with our existence 
(on a planet!)? And the answer, intuitively clear even to Fontenelle, with his 
rudimentary understanding of preconditions for complex life and intelligence, seems to 
be negative. There is only a subset of all configurations leading to the emergence of us 
as intelligent observers, namely the one in which collisions between planets and smaller 
bodies (comets and asteroids) are not too frequent. Thus, our existence acts as an 
observational selection effect (cf. Bostrom 2002),  or “filter” selecting those sites – in 
this case planetary systems – where configurations of cometary orbits are in some sense 
atypical.  
It is interesting to speculate whether the rather low regard in which many 
philosophers of science hold anthropic arguments originates in the fact that from about 
the time of Newton till a couple decades ago, the dominating view emerging from 
natural sciences presumed a single world, in both planetary and cosmological 
connotations. The history of ideas might have been very different, according to this line 
of thought, if the fecundity principle had gone unchallenged from Bruno's days until the 
present, when it was resurrected on a truly universal scale in the modern theories of 
chaotic inflation of Linde, Vilenkin, and others. 
 
 
 
3. Cometary catastrophism resurgent? 
 
As of May 25, 2003, there are 108 extrasolar planets in 94 planetary systems detected 
(for regularly updated list, see http://www.obspm.fr/planets). We remain in virtually 
complete ignorance about the details of those planetary systems, notably their stability 
and their local cometary environments. What we are becoming aware of is the fact that 
 9
simplified cosmogonic theories about the planetary systems' origination do not work; 
among the newly discovered planets there are quite a few oddities, like Jovian planets at 
a fraction of an AU from the central star, or planets with large orbital eccentrities. 
Therefore, we may toy with various thought experiments; suppose, for instance, that 
each planetary system has its own comets and that the distribution of average inclination 
of cometary orbits is a random one. We expect the frequency of cometary collisions 
with planets to be inversely proportional to the maximal inclination of the set of comets 
(thus being maximal in the case of coplanar orbits, as Fontenelle envisaged).  
In the recently very widely discussed hypothesis of “rare Earth” (Ward and 
Brownlee 2000), the role of cometary and/or asteroidal bombardment is essential. 
Namely, Ward and Brownlee argue that, while simple lifeforms may be ubiquitous 
throughout the Galaxy, complex life (and especially intelligent life) must be very rare, 
not only since we do not see any trace of it (Fermi's “paradox”; Brin 1983), but also 
because we now have sufficient knowledge to assess the various “fine tunings” 
necessary for emergence of astrobiological complexity (chemical evolution, orbital 
stability, climate stability, plate tectonics, etc.).  
One of the main factors in keeping an equilibrium state between growth of 
complexity of life forms on the surfaces of terrestrial planets and their destruction or 
prevention of growth is the phenomenon of cometary/asteroidal bombardment of 
planetary surfaces. And today we know that cometary/asteroidal bombardment is 
governed by the dynamics of Oort clouds of individual planetary systems. Obviously, if 
the impact rate is above a certain threshold level, complex life has no chance of arising 
(“impact frustration”; Schopf 1999; Ward and Brownlee 2000). This idea has been 
corroborated by the almost consensual view that some of the major biological mass 
extinctions, notably the KT mass extinction 65 Myr ago, have been caused by 
asteroidal/cometary impact events (e.g. Raup 1986, 1999). In addition, it is widely 
recognized that complex life is more susceptible to extinction than early, simple 
lifeforms.   
A sizeable literature has been devoted so far to the potentially lethal processes 
triggered by a major cometary impact. Some reviews of thought of “the Studious of 
Physical Matters” can be found in the bibliography. In addition, some thoughts on the 
impact of this “neocatastrophic” worldview on wider cultural issues have also been 
published (e.g. Bailey 1995; Clube 1995). One of the most interesting has been 
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published under the indicative title “The Fundamental Role of Giant Comets in Earth's 
History” (Clube 1992). In any case, it seems that after the long uniformitarian slumber, 
we are gradually returning to an awareness of the significance of interactions between 
us and our “cometary environment” (Clube and Napier 1984; Napier and Clube 1997). 
In these circumstances, Fontenelle's anthropic argument gains a new 
significance. If the main reason why complex life is rare in the Galaxy is indeed a high 
average sensitivity of planetary biospheres to cometary bombardment, the fact that the 
impact rates during the last Gyr of the terrestrial history were so low as to enable the 
rise of intelligence is really even more atypical than could have been imagined in the 
time of Newton. A prediction of the “rare Earth” hypothesis is that, on the average, 
impact rates in other planetary systems (for instance, the newly detected ones) are much 
higher, and the Solar System is indeed an exception important – for its biological 
consequences – on the Galactic level. Instead of a crude Design argument, we might, 
following Fontenelle, employ the observation selection and thus give a rational (albeit 
pessimistic) reply to the perennial SETI question: Where are they? (cf. Hart 1975; 
Carter 1983) 
 
 
4. Anthropic selection vs. design 
 
There are a lot of ongoing debates on the interpretation of anthropic coincidences or 
“fine-tunings,” but the debates are usually plagued by more than a few 
misunderstandings and confusing issues. Some of the misunderstandings and confusions 
stem from misunderstanding of the nature of the explanatory task itself. As an instance 
of the latter we can consider the effort invested in proving that the anthropic 
“coincidences” or “fine-tunings” do not imply (intelligent) design.3 As explained in 
numerous beautiful details and examples in the recent monograph of Bostrom (2002), 
the true spirit of anthropic reasoning has nothing to do with teleological or the theistic 
design agendas. Instead, it is dealing with exactly the sort of observational selection 
effects discussed above; and its modern explication is surprisingly similar to the one 
offered by Fontenelle more than three centuries ago (albeit on a much smaller level).
 It is interesting that Fontenelle’s writing is quite bold in the emphasis on the 
                                                 
3 An egregious recent example is Klee (2002). 
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explanatory efficiency of the anthropic selection effect: “the reason... is extremely 
evident.” In contradistinction to the host of modern authors, who only reluctantly, and 
with great hesitation admit this anthropic point of view as valid, Fontenelle is 
refreshingly clear and reasonable. The cause is perhaps the fact that he was living and 
working in the epoch of great changes and strides forward in the human understanding 
of the universe, to which a dialogue between science and metaphysics was quite natural 
and indeed a necessary part of any discourse in natural philosophy. In particular, he 
lacked a bizarre fear of anthropocentrism, which permeates modern writings on the 
anthropic principles. In particular the opponents of the anthropic reasoning have raised 
accusations along that favorite line of attack (e.g. Pagels 1998). These accusations are 
not only quid pro quo, but also based essentially on innuendo: serious anthropic 
thinking has nothing to do with anthropocentrism, except the unfortunate similarity of 
words. Fontenelle’s argument demonstrates this quite clearly. 
It was Newton’s cosmology, ironically enough, which was narrow and 
anthropocentric, and with good reason, since one of the main strands of Newton’s work 
was his aggressive theistic agenda and promotion of the Design argument. The same 
tension between Newton’s and Fontenelle’s views is still present today in the form of 
the tension between the two interpretations of the anthropic fine-tunings. The 
interpretation of these “coincidences” as indications of intelligent design represents a 
continuation of the broadly Newtonian worldview, while the antithetical view of fine-
tunings as observation selection effects (within the multiverse of either cosmology or 
quantum mechanics) bears the hallmark of Fontenelle’s approach. The former is still 
motivated by some extra-scientific reasons as it was in the XVII century, while the latter 
again displays scientific superiority.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We have investigated the first instance of application of the observer self-selection in 
what would centuries later become astrobiology, notably the issue of cometary 
bombardment and impact frustration of the origin and evolution of life and sentience on 
Earth. Fontenelle’s argument for a high inclination of cometary orbits is an excellent 
illustration of the entire paradigm of regarding the anthropic principle as selection 
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effect, having nothing to do with the alleged metaphysical notion of intelligent design. 
Thus, its value is not only historical, but pedagogical as well.  
 
 
Acknowledgements. The author wholeheartedly thanks Branislav Nikolić, Saša 
Nedeljković, Milan Bogosavljević, Ivana Dragićević, and a referee for invaluable help 
in improving a previous version of the manuscript. The inspiration and kind support of 
Irena Diklić have been crucial for the completion of this project. The author also 
acknowledges partial support of the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Development 
of Serbia through the projects no. 1196, "Astrophysical Spectroscopy of Extragalactic 
Objects" and no. 1468, "Structure and Kinematics of the Milky Way." 
 
 
References 
 
Bailey, M. 1995, Vistas in Astronomy 39, 647. 
Barker, P. and Goldstein, B. R. 1988, Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 19, 299. 
Barrow, J. D. and Tipler, F. J. 1986, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford 
 University Press, New York). 
Bostrom, N. 2002, Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Effects in Science and 
 Philosophy (Routledge, London). 
Brin, G. D. 1983, Q. Jl. R. astr. Soc. 24, 283. 
Carter, B. 1974, in Leslie, J. 1990. (edt.) Physical Cosmology and Philosophy  
 (Macmillan Publishing Company, London). 
Carter, B. 1983, Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London A 310, 347.  
Clube, S. V. M. 1992, Celest. Mech. 54, 179.  
Clube, S. V. M. 1995, Vistas in Astronomy 39, 673.  
Clube, S. V. M. and Napier W. M. 1982, The Cosmic Serpent (Universe Books, New 
 York).  
Clube, S. V. M. and Napier, W. M. 1984, Mon. Not. R. astr. Soc. 211, 953. 
Clube S. V. M. and Napier W. M. 1990, The Cosmic Winter (Basil Blackwell Ltd,  
 Oxford). 
Collier, J. 1996, Symmetry: Science and Culture 7, 247. 
 13
Darling, D. 2001, Life Everywhere (Basic Books, New York). 
Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bouyier de 1767, Conversation on the Plurality of the Worlds, 
 (transl. from French, 2nd edition, London). 
Halley, E. 1726, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London 33, 118. 
Hart, M. H. 1975, Q. Jl. R. astr. Soc. 16, 128. 
Hoyle, F. 1987, Earth, Moon, and Planets 37, 1. 
Hoyle, F. and Wickramasinghe, N. C. 1979, Diseases from Space (Harper & Row, New 
 York). 
Hoyle, F., Wickramasinghe, N. C., and Watkins, J. 1986, Viruses from Space 
 (University College Cardiff Press, Cardiff). 
Klee, R. 2002, Brit. J. Phil. Sci.  53, 331. 
Ksanfomaliti, L. V. 2000, Astronomicheskii Vestnik 34, 529 (in Russian). 
Linde, A. D. 1990, Inflation and Quantum Cosmology (Academic Press, San Diego). 
Marcy, G. W and Butler, R. P. 1998, Annu. Rev. Astron. Astrophys. 36, 57. 
Marcy, G. W and Butler, R. P. 2000, Publ. Astron. Soc. Pacific 112, 137. 
Munitz, M. K. 1986, Cosmic Understanding (Princeton University Press, Princeton). 
Napier, W. M. 2001, Mon. Not. R. astr. Soc. 321, 463. 
Napier, W. M. and Clube, S. V. M. 1997, Rep. Prog. Phys. 60, 293.  
Nozick, R. 1981, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard University Press, Cambridge). 
Pagels, H. R. 1998, in Modern Cosmology and Philosophy, ed. by J. Leslie, 
 (Prometheus Books, New York), p. 180. 
Raup, D. M. 1986, Science 231, 1528. 
Raup, D. M. 1999, The Nemesis Affair: A Story of the Death of Dinosaurs and Ways of 
 Science (2nd edition, W. W. Norton & Company, New York). 
Schechen, S. J. 1997, Comets, Popular Culture, and the Birth of Modern Cosmology 
 (Princeton University Press, Princeton). 
Schindewolf, O. 1962, “Neokatastrophismus?” Deutsch Geologische Gesellschaft 
 Zeitschrift Jahrgang 114, 430. 
Schopf, J. W. 1999, Cradle of Life: The Discovery of Earth's Earliest Fossils (Princeton 
 University Press, Princeton). 
Spencer Jones, H. 1952, Life on Other Worlds (2nd edition, English Universities Press, 
 Ltd., London) 
Tegmark, M. 1996, Found. Phys. Lett. 9, 25. 
 14
Ward, P. D. and Brownlee, D. 2000, Rare Earth (Springer Verlag, New York). 
Yeomans, D. K. 1991, Comets: A Chronological History of Observation, Science, Myth, 
 and Folklore (John Wiley & Sons, New York). 
 15
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Bernard Le Bouyier de Fontenelle (1657–1757). 
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Figure 2. The obsession of late XVII century with comets is summarized in this vivid 
illustration from the book (or pamphlet) on "Surprizing Miracles" by Nathaniel Crouch 
(London, 1685).4  
 
                                                 
4 Courtesy of Houghton Library, Harvard University.  
 
